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Sentencing Complexities in National Security Cases
To discuss the sentencing complexities in military national
security cases, first defining a national security case and
then distinguishing Department of Defense (DOD) prose-
cutions from those by the Department of Justice (DOJ) is
helpful. Following that, this artide explains the challenges
national security cases present, including the introduction
of classified information and the difficulty in correlating
degrees of potential harm to national security to a level of
punishment.
I. What is a National Security Case?
There is no agreed upon definition of a "national security
case." Civil liberties groups litigating U.S. government
travel watch lists, monitoring of cell phone call data, or
overseas targeted killing operations are civil national secu-
rity cases. So too are certain criminal cases brought by the
DOJ in U.S. District Courts and the DOD in military pro-
secutions or courts-martial. Some of the federal and mili-
tary prosecutions are considered national security cases by
the charges, the federal law, or Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) article allegedly violated. Other federal and
military cases are considered national security cases not by
the charges but by the overall context of the prosecution.
This article employs a useful but admittedly not dispositive
indicator of a national security case-whether the pro-
ceeding involves classified information.
The DOJ is involved in the vast majority of national
security cases, prosecuting criminal cases and defending
the U.S. government in civil cases. The role of the DOD is
triggered when the individuals who allegedly committed
the offense(s) are subject to the UCMJ.' Although service-
members are not the only category of individuals subject to
the UCMJ, 2 in practice U.S. military justice is essentially
limited to the DOD prosecuting members of the U.S.
military.
II. What is a Military National Security Case?
The UCMJ allows for assimilating and charging federal law
violations.3 But the military only does so when there is not
an applicable punitive UCMJ article. Thus, almost all mil-
itary national security cases only involve violation(s) of
military law. There are several articles of the UCMJ the
violation of which would almost always be considered
a national security case, and there are other articles the
violation of which may qualify based on the details or con-
text of an individual case. 4
The articles of the UCMJ which presumptively yield
a national security case include:
Article io 4 -Aiding the Enemy: This charge encom-
passes servicemembers who aid or attempt to aid the
enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies or other
things. 5
Article io6-Spies: This charge encompasses spy-
ing. It's more a notional than practical charge as the
punishment is per se unconstitutional. The manda-
tory punishment for someone convicted of spying is
death.
6
Article io6a-Espionage: A servicemember violates
this article in much the same way as a violation of
Article 104. The key distinction is that Article 104
involves an enemy (any hostile body that the U.S.
military is opposing), whereas espionage involves
a foreign enemy against whom the U.S. is not
engaged in armed conflict.7
Other military prosecutions involve facially neutral
charges and qualify as national security cases on an indi-
vidual basis. Examples include the 2013 court-martial of
Private First Class Bradley Manning for aiding the enemy
in violation of Article 104 and then a host of violations of
Article 92 (failure to obey a lawful order or regulation)
stemming from his role in providing information to Wiki-
Leaks. The Article 104 charge is a per se national security
charge, but you would need to know the context of the
Article 92 violations in order to say the same of them. The
vast majority of the time Article 92 violations have nothing
to do with national security, so context is key. In Manning's
case the Article 92 charges referred to his violating the
Army's regulation on information assurance, which details
how to properly store, protect, and transmit unclassified and
classified information. Manning violated the regulation, and
thus Article 92, by wrongfiflly moving classified files, cables,
videos, and presentations from a secure government system
onto his personal computer, a nonsecure system.
Similarly, when two U.S. servicemembers attacked and
killed fellow servicemembers in separate incidents-in
Kuwait shortly before the United States invaded Iraq in
20o3, 8 and at Ft. Hood, Texas, in 2oo9 9-the U.S. Army
charged both with murder and attempted murder under the
UCMJ. It is the context of these crimes-that the service-
member defendants were Muslim and purportedly acting
in support of the Islamic extremist groups the United States
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was fighting and against U.S. servicemembers either in, or
preparing to deploy to, the Middle East-that renders these
prosecutions national security cases.'0
Thus, the military will, on rare occasion, prosecute
a servicemember for UMCJ violations that presumptively
and/or contextually render the process a national security
case. The rarity of such proceedings is itself a challenge;
the military prosecutor and defense counsel are very
unlikely to have previously tried a case involving classified
information. And although a court-martial need not tech-
nically involve classified information to constitute
a national security case, the overwhelming majority of
them do."
The introduction of classified information significantly
alters the contours of a court-martial, before the proceed-
ings, during the merits, on sentencing, and even posttrial
and on appellate matters. In general classified information
creates a tension that does not exist in other cases, between
the competing values of the government's interest to pro-
tect national security information from disclosure and the
accused's right to a fair trial. This tension is exacerbated in
the military at the pretrial stage as the military practices
open-file discovery, which is made functionally impossible
in the need-to-know environment of classified information.
Further, the presence of classified information, and the
difficulty in correlating degrees of potential harm to
national security to a level of punishment in the absence of
sentencing guidelines, both add complexity to the sen-
tencing process in these cases.
Ill. Sentencing Complexities in National Security Cases
Classified information often poses the largest challenge in
sentencing. The challenges begin before trial with the
byzantine manner by which material is determined to be
classified and only increases when the material is intro-
duced in court. Concern about safeguarding classified
material dictates any number of aspects of the conduct of
sentencing proceedings. And a mistake regarding handling
of classified evidence is at best glaring hypocrisy 2 and may
even constitute a criminal violation. 3
A. Classified Information
Under Military Rule of Evidence 505, classified information
"means any information or material that has been deter-
mined by the Unites States Government pursuant to an
executive order, statute or regulations, to require protection
against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national
security, and any restricted data, as defined in 42 U.S.C.
2014(y).' 4 The required basis for classifying material is
that its unauthorized release would harm national security.
The level of classification corresponds to the amount of
damage the unauthorized release would cause, ranging
from grave damage equating to top secret, serious damage
to secret, and damage to confidential.
Determining the existence of classified information is
a process that in equal parts resembles Alice In Wonderland
and Joseph Heller's Catch-22. A U.S. Army prosecution of
a federalized National Guard soldier who attempted to aid
al-Qaeda is instructive. The soldier, Ryan Anderson, was
lower ranking and did not possess a security clearance and
thus did not have access to classified material. Anderson
exchanged a number of text messages and participated in
two meetings with people whom he thought were members
of al-Qaeda, but who were in fact federal agents. Between
the text messages, materials he delivered, and what he said
at the meetings, Anderson provided information concern-
ing the vulnerabilities of U.S. Army vehicles and of indi-
vidual soldier equipment used in Iraq. Much of what
Anderson said proved correct. It also proved to be classified.
Because Anderson did not have a security clearance, this led
to his military defense counsel, who did have a security
clearance, not being able to discuss Anderson's statements
with Anderson. The reverse of this problem occurred in
a U.S. Air Force court-martial; the military accused,
a fighter pilot, could not, at least initially, discuss classified
aspects of his case, notably the rules of engagement, with
his civilian defense counsel.' 5
The process by which information is reviewed and
accessed to determine whether it's classified is beyond the
scope of this chapter. And there is an entirely differently
process by which unclassified governmental information
the disclosure of which would be detrimental to the public
interest is privileged.' 6 Suffice to say both are cumbersome
and slow processes, made more so when the entity making
the determination is outside the DOD. The processes are so
onerous that sometimes defense counsel will seek to
include classified information in a proceeding as a form of
leverage against the prosecution, a technique known as
"graymail."' 7 And yet the complexities only increase fol-
lowing a determination that relevant information is classi-
fied and introduced in court. Table i highlights the
differences and similarities between how the different
federal criminal forums-federal court, military courts-
martial, and military commissions-treat classified
information.
B. Impact of Classified Information on
Sentencing Process
The complexities include dictating which courtrooms may
and may not be used, a host of requirements on counsel for
both sides, and even how the military judge, court person-
nel, witnesses, and the panel (military jury) operate.
The starting point for understanding the enormous
complexity added by the introduction of classified infor-
mation is to recognize that all personnel and facilities must
be cleared to handle or receive classified information. Thus
security managers must inspect and approve the courtroom
itself as a location in which classified information may be
discussed and stored. In terms of personnel, although
many servicemembers possess security clearances, many
do not. And civilian witnesses or counsel generally don't
have security clearances, which leads to considerable delays
in the progress of the trial as counsel go through the
clearance process.
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Table 1. Classified Information Comparison
Use of Classified Information
* CIPA - Classified Information Procedure Act codified at 18 U.S.C. App. 3. CIPA is a procedural tool, not an evidentiary
priviledge.[a]
* MRE 505 - Military Rule of Evidence 505, Classified Information. Created through authority under 10 U.S.C. § 836. Hybrid rule of
both priviledge (national security and executive) and procedure. MRE 505 is based on the unreacted House version of CIPA.
* Military Commissions - Formally recognizes a classified information priviledge. Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA),
subchapter V, 10 U.S.C. §§ 949p 1-949p 7.
Discovery
* CIPA- Does not on its face include standards for discovery, yet "six of the federal circuit courts of appeal have adopted a 'relevant
and helpful' standard for determining whether the defense is entitled to discovery of classified information."[b]
* MRE 505 - Allows for discovery of "noncumulative, relevant, and helpful to a legally cognizable defense, rebuttal of the
prosecution's case, or to sentencing."[c] MRE 505 clearly envisions litigation over classified information discovery.
* Military Commissions - Provides for discovery of classified information after a demonstration that the evidence is
"noncumulative, relevant, and helpful to a legally cognizable defense, rebuttal of the prosecution's case, or to sentencing. "[c]
Use of Precedent
* CIPA - "Extensive jurisprudence interpreting CIPA in the more than 30 years since it was enacted."[d]
* MRE 505 - Few courts-martial involve classified information, thus there are few reported decisions.
* Military Commissions - Relies on CIPA case law as precedent.
Closing Proceedings to the Public
* CIPA - Does not allow closed sessions during which classified evidence may be admitted.
* MRE 505- Allows closed sessions during which classified evidence may be admitted.
* Military Commissions -Allows closed sessions during which classified evidence may be admitted.
Declassification
* CIPA- Does not provide a mechanism.
* MRE 505 - Does not provide a mechanism.
* Military Commissions - "[P]rovides a mechanism (and through its implementing regulations, the personnel and resources) to
accomplish it."[e]
[a] See Jennifer K. Elesa, Comparison of Rights in Military Commission Trials and Trials in Federal Court, Congressional Research Service
(Mar. 21, 2014); Edward C. Liu & Todd Garvey, Protecting Classified Information and the Rights of Criminal Defendants: The Classified
Information Procedures Act, Congressional Research Service (Apr. 2, 2012).
[b] Christopher W. Behan, Military Commissions and Conundrum of Classified Evidence: A Semi-Panglossian Solution, 37 So. Ill. L.J. 643, 665
(2013), available at http://www.law.siu.edu/our-people/deans/behan.publication.html.
[c] MCA 2009 § 949p-4(a)(2).
[d] Behan, supra [b] at 667.
[e] Behan, supra [b] at 666-67.
In addition to impacting where national security trials
may be held and the personnel who may be involved, clas-
sified information dictates the conduct of the trial. Classified
information may only be introduced or discussed in dosed
sessions, meaning that the only people present have the
requisite security clearance and need to know the informa-
tion being discussed. But given both the accused's and
public's rights to a public trial, the military judge may close
the courtroom for only those portions that involve classified
information.' 8 This leads to both advocacy and organiza-
tional challenges for counsel and the military judge.
To limit the number of times the courtroom needs to be
closed and then reopened, most military judges require that
each side introduce all unclassified information in one
open session and then all the classified information in one
closed session. The result is that unless a witness's testi-
mony is either completely undassified or completely las-
sified, their testimony is bifurcated. Likewise, to the extent
counsel's sentencing arguments involve classified infor-
mation, counsel will need to make their unclassified argu-
ment in open court, and then that portion of their argument
that involves classified evidence in a closed session. This
presents challenges in terms of maintaining a coherent
case presentation.
The military judge in a national security case is con-
stantly striving for a balance-maintaining as much of the
court-martial open to the public as possible while properly
safeguarding classified information. One technique mili-
tary judges will utilize is to have a security manager present
in court. When in open session, the security manager will
signal when either a question or part of a witness's testi-
mony approaches or crosses the line of classified informa-
tion. Both counsel and witnesses tend to become timid
during discussion of any issue close to the classified
boundary. Both counsel and witnesses start to build in long
pauses between sentences and even in the middle of sen-
tences to allow for the security manager to signal. The result
is a process that safeguards classified information but can
be an awkward and atypical example of military justice and
advocacy, which is even more unfortunate as national
security cases are more likely to be high-profile and involve
media attention.
Counsel, court personnel, and jurors all must separate
unclassified from classified information. That sounds
straightforward enough, but the constant vigilance required
by all involved, coupled with fear of a misstep, is taxing. For
jurors, one technique is to have different colored notepads
for unclassified and classified sessions. For counsel,
ensuring the proper handling of classified material present
in the courtroom involves meeting with a security manager
before and after court to recover and redeposit the items
from a safe. Ideally the prosecution and defense will each
have their own safe for storage of classified material, but
that's not always possible, which then creates additional
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challenges. On breaks during the proceedings, counsel
must ensure that any classified information is appropriately
safeguarded.
If counsel wish to use a computer to store notes, argu-
ments, and other case-related material, if any of the mate-
rial is classified, then the laptop must be certified to store
such material. And unless and until the information is
properly removed, the computer is considered a classified
storage device and must be treated as such. This means not
being able to leave the laptop unattended, storing it in a safe
at a night, and not taking it home.
Members of the court staff are not immune from the
challenges classified information presents. Similar to
counsel's laptop, the court reporter must have any com-
puter used to transcribe testimony during classified ses-
sions certified, and once used the computer is then, and
must be treated as, a classified storage device. Likewise,
court staff members are responsible for the proper han-
dling and storage of classified information admitted as
evidence.
C. Determining Punishment
In many national security cases, reducing amorphous
concepts like grave or serious damage to national security to
how long the convicted servicemember should spend in
confinement is yet another challenge. In cases like Ander-
son, where the accused was communicating with federal
agents,. not al-Qaeda, no classified information ever reached
the terrorist group. This leaves the military prosecutor to
argue for punishment based on the accused's intent, but
not actual harm following consummated acts. And the
"victims" are often conceptual-the good order and disci-
pline and morale of a military unit. Although those con-
cepts are critically important, in advocacy terms they tend
not to lend themselves as well to a sentencing arguments
focusing on human victims.
Even in cases where the accused did convey information
determined to be classified to an unauthorized person or
entity, identifying the harm that directly resulted from the
disclosure is difficult. In the Manning case, the prosecution
called an intelligence expert to testify to the harm Man-
ning's leak caused. For more than three hours he testified
about the DOD's concerns that Manning's leaks "would
erode trust between nations, between citizens and leaders,
and between American soldiers and civilians in places like
Afghanistan... 9 But on cross-examination he "could not
cite specific data showing the effect of the leak on the
number of foreign civilians and emissaries talking to the
United States."2
These challenges are made greater by the lack of military
sentencing guidelines, which might serve as a base from
which upward or downward departures would be consid-
ered.2 Instead, for the vast majority of punitive articles of
the UCMJ, there is no minimum mandated punishment.22
And for cases involving the per se national security charges
of aiding the enemy or espionage, the potential punishment
ranges from no punishment up to and including the death
penalty. Such a range better allows for individualized sen-
tencing. But it can also lead to wildly disparate sentences in
different courts-martial for similar offenses.
IV. Conclusion
Military national security courts-martial infrequently occur.
When they do occur, military counsel, judges, and court
personnel endeavor to perform their function at a high
level. Unfortunately, the process by which the U.S. gov-
ernment conducts classification reviews and the military's
inexperience in national security cases often results in the
form of safeguarding classified information trumping the
substantive function of the underlying trial process. And by
the time the sentencing phase is reached, understandable
but unfortunate focus is placed on simply concluding the
trial without mishandling classified information.
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